Abstracts of Papers Written in German
The World is the Totality of Facts, not of Things
Abstract: The paper tries to defend an ontological reading of Wittgenstein's thesis that the world is the totality of facts and is not the totality of things. In the first paragraph some merits of an ontology of facts are considered, e.g. for a substantial correspondence theory of truth. The second paragraph relates the ontological primacy of facts to the semantic primacy of statements. The third paragraph uses the introduction of an ontology of facts to introduce some tools of a logic of situations. And the last paragraph employs facts to solve Lewis` residual problem of singletons in his mereological reinterpretation of set theory.
Is Transcendental Pragmatics Holistic?
Abstract: Transcendental pragmatics as developed by Karl Otto Apel has been the object of various criticisms. Against the fallibilists' claim (Hans Albert) that argumentation is at last either dogmatic, axiomatic or circular, the transcendental pragmatists have given an argument that ultimate foundation ('Letztbegriindung') cannot be proved to be impossible. But this clarification of their claims leaves open the questions whether their method can establish universal statements, and whether they prove statements which are synthetic a priori. Against the claim of the reconstructive scientist (Jürgen Habermas) they have to restate their view, and take into account an element of fallibilism. Here we encounter a first element of holism. With regard to the question whether there can be ultimate foundation without ultimate foundation of the method of ultimate foundation holism breaks in. The distinction between a vicious and a transcendental circle, used against Albert, is of no use in the establishment of the transcendental circle
A Note on the Argument Structure of Kant's Refutation of Idealism
Abstract: With respect to the "Refutation of Idealism" Kant claims to have given a proof. The paper uses the semi-formal means of non-formal logic to show that Kant really succeeds in giving a proof. Given the formalization of the premises Cartesian Idealism is refuted. This proof, nevertheless, is seen to depend either on a premise or a premise disguised as a definition which presupposes the very claim that is not accepted by the Cartesian. Therefore Kant, although his argument being formally valid, stands in need to supplement the "Refutation of Idealism" with further argument (in the Paralogism for example).
Sartre's Trancendental Phenomenology of Self Awareness
Abstract. Sartre gives in the introduction of Being and Nothingness a phenonomenological account of self awareness. His approach follows the ideas of Husserl's trancendental phenomenology. The central question is how is it possible that in every act of thinking I not only know of the act and the object thought about but also about me, either thinking explicitly that I am thinking or being non-explicit aware that I am thinking. How can this concept of myself be explained? Sartre proceeds in terms of a pre-reflexive cogito preceding the Cartesian cogito, an idea widely criticised but not without its merits. Sartre's account is presented and then explained using current thinking in the philosophy of mind. Also considered is the crucial role of ontology and Sartre's “ontological proof”.
I, "I", and Me Again. On the Logical Form of Self Awareness
Abstract. Theories of self awareness might aim at explaining the causal role of self awareness, its phenomenology or its representational structure. Roderick Chisholm and David Lewis proposed theories of attitudes de se claiming that these attitudes have a foundational role in knowledge and language. This essay develops a version of a theory of attitudes de se in which a rough model of a I-symbol is used to represent the structure of self awareness. The proposal is motivated by considering the phenomenology of self descriptions and conscious thought. The model is elaborated in connecting attitudes de se with attitudes de re and de dicto and linking the model to the wider field of analysing structural features of consciousness. Several methodological questions of designing a theory of attitudes de se are considered. Finally the model of a de setheory is confronted with a reply from a propositional account of the structure of self awareness.
Chisholm`s Ontological Argument against First Person Propositions
Abstract. In The First Person Roderick Chisholm argues for a non-propositional account of self-awareness. Given his ontological framework he proves that there are no propositions of the first person. Chisholm's framework and argument are formalized in the paper. Given his axioms about properties and states of affairs one can derive that there are no propositions of the first person. The crucial assumption is Chisholm's denial of properties and states of affairs dependent on contingent existents. Chisholm backs up his ontological argument by an epistemological argument against self individuating properties.
Animal Consciousness, Anthropomorphism and Heterophenomenology
Abstract. Studying animal consciousness is confronted with the methodological problem of anthropomorphism. The attribution of complex mental states and representations seems to be an unjustified extension of human categories and faculties to animals. The paper argues that this is a real problem for a cognitive science treatment of animal minds. The historic anthropomorphism of Darwin is seen as a methodological substitute to argue for evolutionary continuity in the absence of genetics. The basic structure of problematic anthropomorphism is outlined. Then, however, the heuristic use of human categories on animals is justified within a framework of "new" anthropomorphism, which takes some hints from Dennett's idea of heterophenomenology.