

## What is Logical Pluralism?

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Within the philosophy of logic there has been an old debate about strengths and weaknesses of so-called “deviant” logics, as compared to standard logic (i.e. First Order Logic with Identity). With the development of a multitude of many-valued and modal logical systems and the various ways they can be employed in various fields of philosophy, linguistics and computer science, former “deviant” logics have become well accepted. Nowadays we seem to have a new and almost contrary debate about whether there is any universal logic at all or only a multitude of systems: logical pluralism. But what does logical pluralism claim?

In this talk one prominent version of logical pluralism is the main target of further questions by logical universalists. Greg Restall’s and JC Beall’s pluralism defends both standard and non-standard logics. And the universalism which is taken here as the basis of exploring the pluralists’ claims is also rooted in the non-standard position of paraconsistent logics, since these can provide truly universal logics.

The first section gives a sketch of this kind of logical universalism. The second and third paragraph ask first questions concerning former explorations into logical pluralism. And the main part explores several ankles to put Beall’s and Restall’s pluralism to the test.

Thus the main aim of the talk is to put forth question to the logical pluralists. So it may be too early to rush to conclusions. On the other hand, it seems, that the case for logical pluralism is far from clear. It is even unclear what exactly logical pluralism is and where it stops. It is even unclear if logical pluralism could be stated as it is if it was true.