Computation & Cognitive Sciences

Classes taught:

  • Cognitive Science

  • Phenomenology

  • Animal Consciousness

  • Computability

  • Speech Act Theory

  • Information Flow

  • Church´s Thesis

  • Computational Complexity

  • Consciousness

  • Semantics

  • Cognitive Ethology

  • Automata Theory

  • Hofstadter: Gödel, Escher, Bach

  • Chomsky's Minimalist Program

  • Situation Semantics

 

Teaching materials:

 

Published Work:

Conceptual Atomism
and Justificationist Semantics.

Bern/New York/Frankfurt a.M. (Lang), 2008.

Table of Content


 

Information and Information Flow
An Introduction.
Frankfurt a.M. (Ontos), 2004.

Table of Content

 

Some Reviews:

 

Some Talks:

 

General Research/Fields of Interest:

Information and Foundations of Computability

Cognitive Science needs a theory of information. A theory that tells us what information is. A theory that tells us how it works that sentences, utterances, signs are said to carry information. Does not the smoke carry the information that there is a fire nearby? A theory of information should tell us what informational content is and how we arrive at information or use information to get at more information. It should tell us how information flows from some piece of information we got to more information. – That is what the introductory book is all about.
Another related philosophical application of logic I am interested in is the relation between metalogical results established for formal systems, the theory of computability and the question of the limits of the human mind. Church`s Thesis could be understood as a bridge between meta-logic and the philosophy of mind (see these slides on this questions, or the paper). There is a chapter on computational complexity and semantics in my book Philosophische Semantik. In general issues of computability and complexity link logic and the cognitive sciences.


 

besides:


(Open Court, 2008)

The investigation of animal consciousness can be considered a test case of cognitive science. Investigating animal consciousness seems to be especially difficult since one can ask whether our usual concepts of human cognition should be applied  to animals or whether our phenomenology can be used at all as a heuristic device. On the other hand the treatment of animal consciousness might be a test case of various trade offs and checks between, say, philosophical definitions of mental terms as to be applied to animals, neurophysiology, our reflected intuitions and ethological model building based on a computational theory of animal minds. (Read some theses [pdf] concerning a couple of methodological issues of exploring animal minds here, see also the paper on the role of pain [pdf], and the German paper on anthropomorphism and heterophenomenology [abstract] or the paper on exploring animal beliefs.)

 

 


©  Manuel Bremer